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I. INTRODUCTION

Olivio Dutra, human rights activist and former governor ofBrazil's Rio
Grande do Sul state, recently charged that the world trading system has
worked "a profound dehumanization and systematic banalization of
civilization."' In similar if somewhat less hyperbolic fashion, the president
of the well-regarded Canadian International Centre for Human Rights and
Democratic Development, Warren Allmand, tellingly contrasts
globalization's "presumed contribution to economic growth" with the
reality that "hundreds of millions of people [still] are denied the basic
human rights provided for by the United Nations."2
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules are routinely linked to the
inability of nations to make meaningful progress in sharpening

* Director, International Trade Law Program and Lecturer, University of Florida Levin
College of Law, former Chief Counsel, U.S. Department of Commerce Import Administration. This
essay is a preliminary summary of a fuller exposition of the topic in preparation. I would like to
thank Shireen Hormozdi and Nicole Kibert for their research assistance, Professor Berta Hernandez
for her patience as my teacher, and the students in my International Trade Law, Trade and Human
Rights, Dispute Settlement, and International Trade and the Environment courses for their
intellectual curiosity.
1. Marc Cooper, From Protest to Politics,THE NATION, Mar. 11, 2002, at 1.
2. Warren Allmand, Prefaceto ROBERT HOWSE& MAKUA MUTUA, PROTECTING RIGHTS IN
A GLOBAL ECONOMY: CHALLENGES FOR THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 3 (International Centre

for Human Rights and Democratic Development 2000).
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environmental and other human rights protections - for example, the
failure of the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable
Development to usher in any new treaties despite the bright promise of the
Rio Earth Summit successfully concluded a decade earlier. Environmental
law professor Alyson Flournoy reflects the view broadly held by human
rights advocates with her observation that "[t]he dictates of free trade are
increasingly determinative of the limits of domestic environmental law, as
illustrated by such World Trade Organization cases as Dolphin-Tunaand
Shrimp-Turtle,"3 a position that would find ready assent as applied to a
wide range of human rights topics.
Allmand reminds us that both trade law and human rights law, each of
which narrows the range of policy options available to states, developed
simultaneously but in "splendid isolation." 4 Over several decades
negotiators from the same nations crafted dozens of treaties in each of
these fields of international law, applying their respective disciplines to an
increasingly overlapping range of topics. Yet until very recently the
uninitiated student could be forgiven for wondering whether either group
was even aware of the other's activities, for directly conflicting rules often
emerged and even delegations from the same country seemed not to speak
the same language or spring from the same culture.
Our long-held suspicions that "globalization" - symbolized by the
WTO and other institutions of the Bretton Woods System of transnational
financial and economic organizations created in the mid-1940s to repair the
wartime disintegration of international economic cooperation - had
reached crisis mode were confirmed when fifty thousand well-trained
protestors disrupted the first meeting in the United States of world trade
ministers during the 1999 "Battle in Seattle." In this storied evocation of
the maturing backlash against globalization, protestors convincingly
demonstrated in those few December days that a remarkably broad range
of public interest groups - including those dedicated to health, the
environment, labor, development, and other human rights - view the
present global economic structure as a serious impediment to nations

3. Memorandum from Professor Alyson Flournoy to University of Florida Levin College
of Law Curriculum Committee on Trade and Environment Course Proposal (Feb. 16, 2003) (on file
with the author).
4. Warren Allmand, supra note 2, at 3. The modern basis for human rights law, the U.N.
Charter, calls for signatories to promote "universal respect for ... human rights," U.N. CHARTER
art. 55(c).
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committed to using the power of trade to advance critical non-economic
objectives.'
The common brief of these interest groups is that the market principles
of supply and demand, comparative advantage, and non-discrimination on
which global trade rules are built have encumbered pursuit by nations of

fundamental noneconomic objectives that must in any reasoned legal
hierarchy hold higher societal priority than monetary matters.6
This Essay argues that this claim is both inaccurate and premature, that
in fact the WTO not only is far more than simply neutral as to human rights
law, but that the trade body has made respectable progress in fitting the
square norms of human rights law into the round pegs of utilitarian trade
rules, given the limited jurisdiction of trade negotiators, the recency of the
WTO's binding dispute settlement system, and the unsettled nature of the
human rights law with which trade rules are most likely to intersect.

II.

STRUCTURE OF TRADE RULES

At the outset we should recall that the logic and coherence of the WTO
system - indeed its startling success in increasing world wealth - flow
from a single-minded and relentless dedication to encouraging economic
growth through the elimination of barriers to trade. Nonetheless, the
preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO does not
make free trade an end in itself, but a means to fulfill basic human rights
such as the improvement of global standards of living, promotion of
sustainable development, and preservation of the environment.' GATT
Article XX enumerates a series of public welfare policies that WTO

5. See Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests, in TRADE LAW

AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 495, 512 (May 2002).
6. WARREN ALLMAND, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS (International

Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development 2000) (stating that "human rights [law] is
not some kind of a side-bar, annex or by-product of a trade agreement. . . . [but] a legal and
normative framework for international economic relations" and the standard by which theirsuccess
is evaluated), available at http://serveur.ichrdd.ca/english/commdoc/publications/
globalization/FTAAbriefQcGovt.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2004).
7. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, pmbl.
[hereinafter WTO Agreement]; RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE

NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGALTEXTS 6,33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter LEGALTEXTS]. The WTO
is the umbrella system for two dozen individual agreements addressing a wide array of trade and
trade-related subjects. The WTO incorporated (as GATT 1994) the 1947 GATT that previously had
been - and continues as - the principal source of global trading rules. See WTO Agreement,
supra, Annex I; LEGAL TEXTS, supra, at 19, 485.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

3

222

Florida Journal of
International Law, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 19
FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNA77ONAL LAW

[Vol. 16

Members may pursue even if the trade restrictions that result would violate
basic trade precepts.
Global trade rules are designed to allow nations to make full use of
their comparative advantage; that is, their ability to create a particular
product or service at lower opportunity cost than other nations.'
GATT/WTO rules accomplish this purpose by removing impediments to
the free movement of goods, primarily through non-discrimination
provisions. The Most Favored Nation Clause requires WTO Members to
provide the same treatment to imports from all Members that it gives to its
most favored trading partner.' The National Treatment Clause requires that
foreign goods face equal conditions of competition in the market as like
domestic products.' 0 In addition, Members are bound to limit tariffs
charged on imports to the levels negotiated in successive rounds of tariffreducing negotiations and GATT Article XI forbids quantitative and other
restrictions on imports and exports."
Nonetheless, even as these extensive rules work to break down barriers
to freer trade, Article XX shelters trade constraints taken to protect public
morals, to conserve exhaustible natural resources, to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health, and to preserve national treasures. 2 WTO
Agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and on Technical
Barriers to Trade explicitly reaffirm that no country should be prevented
from taking trade measures needed to protect human life or health or the
environment at the level the country itself considers appropriate."' The
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
authorizes specific remedies to prevent patent rights from adversely
affecting the transfer of technology that is vital to medical care and
economic development of lesser-developed nations. 4

8. PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND
POLICY 12 (6th ed. 2001).

9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT]; LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 7, at 486.
10. GATT, supra note 9, art. III; LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 7, at 490.
11. GATT, supra note 9, arts. II, XI; LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 7, at 488, 500.
12. GATT, supra note 9, art. XX; LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 7, at 519.
13. WTO Agreement on Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994;
WTO Agreement and LEGAL TEXTS, annex IA, supra note 7, at 69; WTO Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, annex IA and LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 7, at
138. This reaffirmation is not without conditions to avoid use of these policies for protectionist
purposes or to restrict trade "unnecessarily."
14. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, supra note 7, annex 1C, arts. 8, 31 and LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 7, at 370-71
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. These provisions act on the preamble's recognition that leastdeveloped country Members need maximum flexibility in implementation of intellectual property
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These provisions clearly sound in human rights law. Yet each of these
WTO Agreements has been roundly criticized for impeding the ability of
governments to meet human rights obligations to their citizens." Is there
another side to this debate?

III. GATT ARTICLE XX'S GENERAL EXCEPTIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
AND WELFARE

Of the ten listed General Exceptions to GATT's fundamental
proscription of discriminatory governmental restrictions on trade, Article
XX(a)'s protection of public morals - whose roots reach to the first
multilateral trade agreement in 192316 - in particular provides a fertile
source of discretion to apply human rights law.
As the former Director of Yale's Global Environment and Trade Study
Steve Charnovitz reminds us, a wide range of trade restrictions over the

years has been based on the "immorality" of activities in other countries,
from prohibitions of trade with countries practicing slavery to the ban on
child pornography."

Article XX(a) likely in addition would support state action on a number
of other human rights concerns," which might prompt a WTO Member to
ban trade to protest immoral acts by a foreign government against its
citizens, such as products made by indentured children or from countries
which deny freedom of the press, the right to emigrate, or with a consistent
pattern of gross violations of human rights. Each of these reasons has been
used by the United States to justify trade restrictions.'

rights "to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base." LEGAL TEXTS, supra note
7, at 366.
15. See, e.g., HOWSE & MUTUA, supra note 2, at 4.
16. International Convention Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities, Nov. 3,
1923, 30 L.N.T.S. 373; see Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, in TRADE LAW
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 325, 339 (2002).

17. Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 346.
18. From a human rights perspective, it is noteworthy that dozens of the tradeagreements predating the GATT routinely linked "moral" with "humanitarian" goals through an exception for
"moral and humanitarian reasons." The drafting history does not resolve the question whether the
reference to "public morals" in Article XX(a) should be viewed as shorthand for the traditional
concept or as evidence of intent on the part of GATT's drafters to exclude whatever humanitarian
objectives may not also sound in moral principles. See Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 340-42, 350.
The fact that the United States drafted the Moral Exception makes a strong case for treatingthe two
formulations as synonymous, which would strengthen coverage by Article XX(a) of human rights
policies.
19. Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 332-33.
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IV. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WTO AND OTHER GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW

In addition to these substantive WTO provisions, the rules that govern
dispute settlement procedures confirm that the GATT and other WTO
agreements constitute part of the body of public international law by noting

that the agreements are to be interpreted in accordance with customary
rules of interpretation of public international law. 20 The "supreme court of
world trade," the WTO's Appellate Body, has from its inception, in such
cases as Gasoline, Shrimp-Turtle, and Hormones, interpreted these rules
as bringing the Vienna Convention into the room with dispute settlement
panels.
"The GATT," as the Appellate Body confirmed in its first decision, "is
not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law."" Not
only must "customary principles of international law" guide interpretations
by WTO dispute panels, but the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the

WTO also requires in Article XVI that "the WTO shall be guided by the
customary practices followed by" Members during their half-century of
adherence to the original 1947 GATT.22 This instruction implicates an even
broader set of customary principles among WTO Members, including
practices that may not yet have reached the status of general customary
international law.23
The Appellate Body and WTO panels have reasserted that Article 3.2
of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding is not intended to limit the
sources of law for a WTO panel to only those rules of general international
law that relate to interpretation of treaties. As the Korea-Government
ProcurementPanel explained, the "language of 3.2 in this regard applies
to a specific problem that had arisen under the GATT" of inappropriate
reliance on negotiating history.24 In a dozen other cases, WTO panels and
20. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 7, annex 2, art. 3.2, and LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 7, at 405
[hereinafter WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding]; see Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public
International Law in the WTO: How FarCan We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 542 (2001).
21. UnitedStates -Standardsfor ReformulatedandConventionalGasoline, WTIDS8/ABIR

at 10 (Nov. 1, 1996), 35 I.L.M. 603, 621 (1996).
22. WTO Agreement, supra note 7, art. XVI:I, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 7, at 17.

23. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, openedfor signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (permitting a resort to other treaties (and their
travaux) to determine what the treaty provision under review, such as one of GATT's Article XX
General Exceptions, means).
24. Korea-MeasuresAffecting Government Procurement, WTO Doc. WT/DS163/R, n. 753
(May 1, 2000).
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the Appellate Body have used rules of general international law
independently of interpreting a particular WTO provision in such areas as

deciding a panel's jurisdiction, drawing adverse inferences, the role of
amicus curiae briefs, and judicial economy."5
The Appellate Body's use of non-WTO general international law in
permitting St. Lucia to make its dispute panel arguments through private
sector attorneys is especially interesting. The WTO Agreement, its Dispute
Settlement Understanding, and the Working Procedures for Panels are
silent on the issue of whether WTO Members must be represented before

panels solely by employees of their government, as the United States had
successfully insisted before the initial Panel. The Appellate Body searched
not only for what customary international law expressly allowed in this

respect, but also for what it did not prohibit, concluding that "we can find
nothing in customary international law or the prevailing practice of
international tribunals which prevents a WTO member from determining
the composition of the delegation in Appellate Body proceedings." 26 The
Appellate Body's willingness from its very first decision in 1996 to
interpret WTO agreements, including the GATT, in their broader
international legal context explains how it has become a factor in the
development not solely of trade law, but of general international law."
With this direction from Members, dispute panels, while respecting the
Vienna Convention's preference for examination of the ordinary meaning
of the WTO provision, read in context and in light of the object and
purpose of the WTO agreement involved,2 ' have not hesitated in the face

25. See UnitedStates-Anti-DumpingAct of1916, WT/DS136/AB/R, para. 54, n.30 (Sept.
26, 2000) (la competence de la competence); Canada-MeasuresAffecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, WT/DS70/AD/R, para. 202 (Aug. 20, 1999) (adverse inferences); United States-Import
Prohibition of CertainShrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 107 (Oct. 12, 1998)
[hereinafter U.S.-Shrimp-Turtle) (amicus briefs); and UnitedStates-MeasuresAffecting Imports
of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses, WT/DS33/AB/R, at 19 (May 23, 1997) (judicial economy).
26. European Communities-Regimeforthe Importation, Sale, andDistributionofBananas,

WT/DS27/AB/R, para. 10 (Sept. 9, 1997).
27. See Phillipe Sands, Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilization of InternationalLaw, 1
YALE HuM. RTs. & DEv. L.J. 85, 97 (1998). As the author notes, panel and Appellate Body
decisions have taken the necessary first steps toward applying norms arising outside the
GATT/WTO context by recognizing that the GATT/WTO rules themselves form part of general
international law. Id. at 99.
28. Vienna Convention, supra note 23, art. 31.
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of equivocal or inconclusive treaty language to look to custom to give
modern meaning to GATT's General Exceptions.
For example, in deciding in the U.S.-Shrimp case whether turtles are

"exhaustible natural resources" within the meaning of Article XX(g), the
Appellate Body answered in the affirmative by giving a dynamic reading
to the 50-year old GATT language through customary law. Noting that the
"words of Article XX(g) ... were actually crafted more than 50 years ago,"
the Appellate Body found that this language nonetheless "must be read by
a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of the community
of nations about the protection and conservation of the environment,"
because the "generic term 'natural resources' in Article XX(g) is not
'static' in its content but is rather 'by definition, evolutionary,"' citing as
support for this general principle of international law a case decided by the
International Court of Justice. 29
The Appellate Body, noting that the 1994 WTO Agreement makes by
its preamble protection of the environment and promotion of sustainable
development important goals of international policy, proceeded to examine
environmental treaties such as the Conventions on Biological Diversity, on
the Law of the Sea, and on International Trade in Endangered Species to
justify its conclusions that "natural resources" included living resources
and that living natural resources were indeed "exhaustible." 30
Importantly, the Appellate Body also responded in this decision to the
decades old proposition that as "exceptions" to the GATT's cornerstone
principles, Article XX must be construed narrowly.31 Observing that
Article XX makes the general exceptions available "in recognition of the
legitimate nature of the policies and interests there embodied," the
Appellate Body found that "a balance must be struck between the rightof
a Member to invoke an exception and the duty of that same Member to
respect the treaty rights of the other Members . . .. so that neither of the

29. US.-Shrimp-Turtle,supra note 25, paras. 129-30 (citing Namibia (LegalConsequences)
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Rep. 31 (1971)).
30. Id. paras. 130-32. The Appellate Body was careful in each case to note that complainants
were parties to these non-WTO conventions, implicit recognition that while non-WTO treaties find
proper use as a source of law in interpreting the WTO covered agreements, a WTO Member may
not be held to a treaty to which it is not bound. See Vienna Convention, supra note 23, arts. 30, 41.
The non-WTO environmental treaties were relevant to interpretation of GATT Article XX(g)
because, in light of the WTO preamble's recognition of the objectives of sustainable development
and environmental protection, they reflected the common intentions of WTO Members. Pauwelyn,
supra note 20, at 573.
31. See, e.g., United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS21/R
(unadopted), para. 5.22 (Sept. 3, 1991).
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competing rights will cancel each other out."32 Elevating the general
exceptions to an equal plane with GATT's Four Pillars works a sea change

in the nature of Article XX analysis by WTO dispute panels.
In the EC-Beef Hormones case, Panels considered whether the
"precautionary principle" was customary international law that could
justify the EC's failure to meet the scientific evidence standards of the
WTO's food safety rules.3 3 In certainly the broadest statement by a WTO
dispute settlement entity of the role of general international law, including
custom, in the interpretation of a WTO covered agreement, the WTO Panel
in the Korea-Government Procurement case found that "customary
international law applies generally to the economic relations between the
WTO Members" to the extent there is no conflict or inconsistency or other

indication that the WTO agreement has "contracted out" of the customary
principle. 34
The Panel proceeded to apply customary international law, as found by
the International Court of Justice and codified in the Vienna Convention,35
to decide whether U.S. consent to a WTO Agreement had been invalidated
by error in the treaty negotiations, an affirmative finding of which would
have trumped the issue whether Korea's airport construction was covered
by its WTO Government Procurement Agreement Schedule.36
From this record we can see that WTO Members have both given
themselves wide berth to pursue noneconomic policies such as human
rights law and also have directed dispute panels interpreting these

32. US.-Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 25, paras. 156, 159 (emphasis in original).
33. EC-MeasuresConcerningMeatandMeat Products, WT/DS48/R, para.8.157 (Aug. 18,
1997) (Panel Report); WT/DS26 & 48/AB/R, para. 123 (Jan. 16, 1998) (Appellate Body Report).
34. Korea-MeasuresAffecting Government Procurement, WTO Doc. WT/DS ] 63/R, para.

7.96 (May 1, 2000) [hereinafter Korea-Gov't Procurement].
35. Id. para. 7.123.
36. Id. paras. 7.124-7.125. Notably, the Panel also decided that even though the subjectmatter jurisdiction of the Panel was determined, under Article 7.1 of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding, solely by the claims made in the U.S. request for establishment of a panel, which
was silent on this issue, the Panel nonetheless was permitted to examine the issues that had been
raised "in the broader context of customary international law." Id. para. 7.101 n.755. Duke
University law professor and former WTO legal affairs officer Joost Pauwelyn posits that the Panel
likely exceeded its jurisdiction by entertaining a claim that does not, as required by the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding, arise under one of the WTO "covered agreements," although
he believes that the Panel would have been justified in resorting to the customary rule of error in
defense of a claim under a covered agreement. Pauwelyn, supra note 20, at 570-71. I would note
that the Panel had found common origins for the customary rule of error and the GATT
nonviolation claim which the United States had in fact raised and the Panel was attempting to
squeeze error law into an interpretation of the GATT claim. Korea-Gov'tProcurement,supra note
34, paras. 7.100-7.101.
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provisions to be guided by general international law in their interpretations
of claims under the WTO covered agreements.

V. CONCLUSION

Two major problems remain for the legal advocate of human rights
concerned with restraints imposed by trade rules, neither of which I submit
may fairly be laid at the feet of trade negotiators.
One I mentioned at the start: that much of human rights law is not so
widely accepted that WTO panels may reliably be expected to apply its
teaching to inform a WTO provision.37 This is especially true for human
rights principles most likely to intersect the trade rules, such as the abuse
of core labor rights, including a ban on products made by indentured
children, or protection of the health and safety of indigenous populations,
including trade restrictions aimed at preserving the natural resources on
which their future relies.38 Of course we face the issue of which human
rights principles have become customary 39 only because states have been

37.

DAVID WEISSBRODT, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND

PROCESS 23 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing which human rights principles have become customary
international law); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 702 (1987).
38. An example of the latter would be a prohibition against importation of petroleum products
produced in a Central American country for the purpose of protecting indigenous peoples from
exploitation through polluting and wasteful drilling for oil by multinational companies with
government cooperation. As to the former, the United States created the conditions for a WTO
dispute with congressional authorization beginning in 1997 to ban import of products made by
indentured child labor. See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-61, § 634, 111 Stat. 1272, 1316 (1997); Charnovitz, supra note 16, at 370-71.
39. Even if the human rights principle at issue qualifies as customary international law, the
issue may still remain whether the customary rule prevails in the event of direct conflict with a
WTO Agreement provision. The Vienna Convention does not expressly resolve this quandary,
leaving the matter instead to an application of interpretive Articles 30 and 31, especially Article
31(3)(c)'s "principle of integration." See Sands, supra note 27, at 95. The Restatement provides that
a later treaty provision trumps a prior rule of customary law. If the customary principle is later, it
will prevail if the parties to the treaty clearly display an intention for the customary principle to do
so. Supra text accompanying note 35, § 1020). Given the continuing revision of WTO Agreements
through successive negotiating rounds, usually making the WTO provision the later in time, even
the Restatement's simplistic rule becomes complex. See William A. Kerr, Who Should Make the
Rules of Trade? - The Complex Issue ofMultilateralEnvironmentalAgreements, 3 ESTEY CENTRE
J. INT'L L.& TRADE POL. (2)162, 165 (2002), available at http://www.esteyjournal.com (last visited
Jan. 8, 2004).
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unwilling in either trade or human rights treaties explicitly to give
instruction on which provisions should prevail in the event of conflict. 40
The second problem is that the WTO, even while making way for
noneconomic objectives, ensures that trade priorities are ranked higher
through a "necessity" test. To be considered "necessary," the measure
chosen to implement the human rights objective must be the least traderestrictive border limitation that will accomplish the human rights
objective. 4 1
Human rights advocates of course fault the WTO for not instead asking
what trade measure will best accomplish the human rights objective.
However, once it is recognized that governments have refused to provide
explicit guidance on how to resolve conflict between the two objectives,
it should not be surprising that trade negotiators felt unjustified in
redrawing the lines of their own jurisdiction.
Even here, WTO dispute panels have been highly deferential to
Members when the human right to health is at stake. In the Hormones case,
the Appellate Body placed the burden on the complaining Member to
demonstrate that a viable measure less restrictive of trade exists. 42 The
Appellate Body also emphasized in Asbestos the importance of the
discretion accorded WTO Members to choose their own level of health
protection by insisting that any alternative to the health measure selected
must be effective in accomplishing the Member's chosen level of
40. The one notable exception is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which
expressly gives priority to several named multilateral environmental agreements iftrade restrictions
undertaken in pursuit of their terms otherwise would violate the expansive "GATT-Plus" trade
disciplines of the NAFTA. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, art. 104, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993).
41. Even so, the Appellate Body has softened the "necessity" test over the years from the
requirement that the trade restriction must be "unavoidable," to the present inquiry of whether a less
GATr-inconsistent measure is "reasonably available."United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, GATT Doc. DS21/R (unadopted), para. 5.27 (Sept. 3, 1991); European
Communities-MeasuresAffectingAsbestos andAsbestos-ContainingProducts,WT/DS

13 5/AB/R,

para. 171 (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC-Asbestos]. Article XX(g), exempting measures "relating
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources," substitutes a "relationship" test for the
"necessity" requirement of other exceptions. The Appellate Body also has reduced the severity of
this condition from its early interpretation as mandating that the border restriction have

conservation as its "primary aim" to the present unremarkable requirement that the border measure
be "reasonably related" to conservation, thus including measures that have conservation as one of
several equally important objectives. Canada-MeasuresAffecting Exports of UnprocessedHerring

andSalmon, BISD 353S/1 14, para. 4.6 (adopted Mar. 22, 1988); US.-Shrimp-Turtle, supra note
5, para. 141. The Appellate Body's assiduous smoothing of these rough edges between trade and
noneconomic issues has substantially lowered the barriers to meeting Article XX's conditions.
42. EC-MeasureConcerningMeat andMeat Products,WT/DS48/R, paras. 126, 130 (Aug.
18, 1997).
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protection, not some level of protection that results from an abstract
scientific balancing of costs and benefits.4 3
In fact, Georgetown Law Professor Gregg Bloche argues that in effect
the human right to health has become an interpretive principle that informs
a wide range of WTO disputes," even though the WTO Agreements
and likely customary international law - are silent on the existence of
such a right.
One final point. I believe we may rightfully ask whether the September
2003 collapse in Cancun of negotiations at the biennial meeting of WTO
trade ministers marks the beginning of a paradigm shift in trade
negotiations to one that recognizes that the values elevated by the trade
economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo nearly two centuries ago
cannot accurately assign priority to the development, labor, environmental,
humane treatment, freedom from racial discrimination, and other human
rights that most of the world's citizens now demand become a meaningful
part of trade policy. 45 As Brazil's Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, the
man most responsible for the collapse of the talks, has written, "I am
convinced that Cancun will be remembered as the conference that signaled
the emergence of a less autocratic multilateral trading system, .... as a
turning point.. . . As we resume negotiations in Geneva, .. . may we bear
in mind the lessons of Cancun ... [that] developing countries will not be
reduced to the role of supporting actors in discussions that affect their
development prospects."46 With such a shift in values, the international
human rights law essential to development will assume a more prominent
role in global trade policy.
In sum, my view is that trade rules have made a start that must be
considered reasonable under the circumstances in attempting to set
priorities for national pursuit of noneconomic objectives such as human

43. EC-Asbestos, supra note 41, paras.168, 173-74.
44. M. Gregg Bloche, WTO Deference to National Health Policy: Toward an Interpretive
Principle, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 825, 827 (2002).

45. Perhaps Adam Smith's classical theory that individual ambition serves the common good
could be tempered to positive effect by John Nash's equilibrium concept that the maximum benefit
to a group (here, world welfare) can be realized if each individual (here, nation) works for its own
benefit and that ofthe group. See ADAM SMTH, AN INQUIRY INTO THENATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (1937); John Forbes Nash, Non-CooperativeGames (Dissertation 1950);
ISCID Encyclopedia of Science and Philosophy, Intemational Society for Complexity, Information,
and Design (2003), availableat http://www.iscid.org/encyclopedia/NashEquilibrium (last visited
Dec. 17, 2003).
46. Celso Amorim, Commentary: The Real Cancun, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2003, at
A9.
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rights principles, and that there is even some reason to hope that the WTO

will get it right.
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